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INTERNATIONAL REVIEWt
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION
REPORT OF THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON "THE LEGAL
STATUS OF AIRCRAFT" DRAFT CONVENTION, MEETING
IN MONTREAL MARCH-APRIL, 1962
Introduction
1.
On 27 November 1961 the Council decided that the Chairman of the Legal
Committee should be requested to appoint a subcommittee of the Legal Committee
to consider the comments received from States and international organizations on
the draft convention of offences and certain other acts occurring on board aircraft
prepared by the Legal Committee, at its Twelfth Session, held in Munich in 1959.
1.1
Accordingly, the Chairman of the Legal Committee appointed this Subcommittee.

Meetings and Membership
2.
The Subcommittee met at the Headquarters of ICAO in Montreal, from
26 March to 5 April 1962. It held eighteen meetings under the chairmanship of
Mr. R. P. Boyle (United States of America). The following attended:
Mr. J. P. Houle (Canada)
Mr. A. Garnault and Mr. P. Lescure (France)
Mr. G. Schmidt-Rantsch (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. I. Narahashi and Mr. R. Hirano (Japan)
Mr. J. P. Honig and Mr. C. E. Cathalina (Netherlands)
Mr. C. G6mez Jara (Spain)
Mr. A. W. G. Kean (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and
Mr. R. P. Boyle and Mr. J. H. Wanner (United States of America).
2.1
Mr. K. Sidenbladh (Sweden) and Mr. J. B. Diaz (Philippines), Chairman
and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Legal Committee, were present as exofficio members of the Subcommittee.
2.2
Observers in attendance were:
Mr. N. H. Errecart (Argentina)
Messrs. J. C. Cooper and J. G. Gazdik (IATA)
Messrs. R. J. Belec and G. W. Reed (ICPO) and
Mr. N. J. Logan (IFALPA).
2.3
Members of the Subcommittee who could not attend were:
Mr. R. Monaco (Italy)
Mr. E. M. Loaeza (Mexico)
Mr. C. Berezowski (Polish People's Republic), Vice-Chairman of the Legal
Committee and ex-officio member, and
Mr. F. K. Moursi (United Arab Republic).

Preparation of this Report
2.4
The Subcommittee approved the draft of the present report at its final
meeting on 5 April and authorized a Group, composed as follows, to establish the
t Compiled by Julian Gazdik in co-operation with ICAO Officials, E. R. Marlin, Director of
Technical Assistance Bureau, G. F. Fitzgerald (on legal matters), A. M. Lester (on economic/
statistical matters) and Mrs. M. A. Dowling.
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final text: Mr. R. P. Boyle, Mr. J. P. Houle, Mr. P. Lescure and Mr. N. H. Errecart. The Group met on 16 and 17 April and approved the present text.
Method of Work
3.
The Subcommittee agreed that the Munich draft convention should be
considered article by article in the light of the comments which had been filed
with the Organization by the States and international organizations.
3.1
It was further agreed that the purpose of the Subcommittee was not to
prepare a revised draft convention, but rather, in the light of the comments of
States and international organizations and its discussions thereon, to present its
own comments and recommendations to the Legal Committee concerning the
various articles of the draft convention. This procedure would not, however,
preclude the Subcommittee from recommending to the Legal Committee redrafts
of certain articles of the Munich draft where it was felt that such redrafts were
desirable.
3.2
The Subcommittee considered:
(a) the comments made by States and international organizations on the
Munich draft convention: these are comprised in Working Drafts Nos.
3, 4, 5 and 6 which accompany this report (Working Drafts Nos. 1 and 2
being respectively the draft convention and the report thereon prepared
by the Legal Committee at Munich); and
(b) certain new proposals which were presented to the Subcommittee during
its session, namely, those relating to Extradition, "Hijacking" (Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft) and Chartered Aircraft: these are dealt with in paragraphs 34 and 36.3 below.
3.3
With respect to the comments mentioned at (a) in the foregoing subparagraph, it should be mentioned that the Subcommittee gave careful consideration to all of them; those comments in respect of which the Subcommittee recommends specific action are particularly mentioned in this report; the other comments
are not so mentioned, except in a few cases where opinion within the Subcommittee was equally, or almost equally, divided.
3.4
Attention is called to the fact that while the Subcommittee has in this
report expressed its opinions or recommendations on most of the questions examined
by it, it has not done so in some instances. Instead it has referred some questions
to the Legal Committee, calling its attention to the necessity of finding solutions.
The reason for this is that the questions concerned relate to basic issues which
the Subcommittee believes require solution by the Legal Committee itself. Some
examples of this are: the problems concerning State aircraft (see paragraph 9.1
below) ; whether it is obligatory or optional for a State party to the proposed
convention to enact laws giving it jurisdiction over offences committed on its
aircraft outside its territory (paragraph 15 below); extradition (paragraph
34.2) ; "hijacking" (paragraph 35.2 below) ; chartered aircraft (paragraph 36.3
below).
Commentary on the Munich Draft Article by Article
Article 1, paragraph 1, introductory part
4.
The Subcommittee noted that the words "other acts" found in the introductory part of Article 1(1) were intended to mean "acts" jeopardizing the
safety of the aircraft, or persons or property therein, or jeopardizing good order
and discipline on board, as specified in Article 5(1). However, the Subcommittee
considered that this was not entirely clear under the present text of Article 1 (1)
and decided to recommend that the words "other acts" be replaced by the
formula used in Article 5(1), so that the text of the introductory portion of
Article 1(1) would read as follows:
"1. This Convention shall apply in respect of offences and of acts
which, whether or not they are an offence, may or do jeopardize

INTERNATIONAL
the safety of the aircraft or persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board, when committed or
done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting
State, while that aircraft is: . ..".
As a result, consequential drafting changes have been recommended in respect of
Articles 5(1) and 6(1) (see paragraphs 23.4 and 26.3 respectively).
4.1
The Subcommittee recognized that, while Article 1(1) spoke of offences
and acts "committed or done", Article S(1) referred, in addition, to anticipated
acts, thus: "when the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe that
a person has committed, or is about to commit . . . an act...."
(italics
supplied). However, the Subcommittee considered that the lack of reference to
anticipated acts in Article 1(1) would cause no difficulty in the application of
Article 5 (1).
4.2
In relation to the words "by a person on board" found in the introductory
part of Article 1 (1), the question was raised whether or not an offence or an act
contemplated in Article 1 (1) would fall under the convention if the person who
had instigated the offence or act was not on board the aircraft at the time of
occurrence. The view of the Subcommittee was that according to the present
draft of the convention such person must be on board and that it was for the
Legal Committee to decide whether or not the scope of the convention should be
extended to include offences or acts occurring on board the aircraft while their
author was not on board, e.g., a person who sent a package containing a time
bomb.
5.
The Subcommittee decided to recommend to the Legal Committee that the
word "civil" be deleted from the introductory provision of Article 1 (1) in view
of the existence of the definition of "State aircraft" found in Article 1(3). If
the word "civil" was kept in Article 1(1), there might be a conflict between
Article 1(1) and Article 1(3). If the Legal Committee decided to delete the
word "civil" from Article 1(1), consideration should be given to including a
reference to civil aircraft in Article 1 (3) along the lines of the statement included
in the first sentence of Article 3 (a) of the Chicago Convention, which sentence
reads as follows:
"This Convention shall be applicable only t6 civil aircraft, and shall
not be applicable to State aircraft."
Article 1, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) to (d)
6.
The Subcommittee considered that subparagraph (c) should be revised to
make it clear that the subparagraph applied not only to an offence committed
while the aircraft in question was in flight "in the airspace of the State of registration," but also while it was in flight between two points in the territory of
the State of registration even though over the high seas or areas of undetermined
sovereignty. Accordingly, the Subcommittee recommends that subparagraph (c)
be redrafted as follows:
"(c) In flight between two points in the territory of the State of
registration if a subsequent landing is made in another Contracting
State with the said person still on board;"
6.1
The Subcommittee considered that subparagraph (c) as thus redrafted
placed no limitation on the right of the State of subsequent landing to exercise
jurisdiction. Thus, the convention would apply even where the offence concerned
had already come to the knowledge of, and been investigated by, the authorities
of the State of registration during an intermediate stop of the aircraft in the
State of registration.
6.2
The Subcommittee considered that the words "if a subsequent landing is
made in another Contracting State with the said person still on board" require
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clarification in future drafting. In particular, the question was raised whether
the person concerned must have been continuously on board.
The Subcommittee noted that, while the English text of subparagraph (c)
6.3
contained the word "still," no equivalent word was found in the French and
Spanish texts. Therefore, it decided to recommend that this discrepancy be corrected by the insertion of the words "encore" and "todavia" in the French and
Spanish texts respectively.
Article 1, paragraph 2
The Subcommittee noted the necessity of so drafting Articles 1(2) and
7.
5 (3) as to avoid a conflict between them and to make it clear that the provisions
of the latter applied even where the aircraft was not in flight.
Article 1, paragraph 3
8.
The Subcommittee noted that certain difficulties could arise in the application of the second sentence of Article 1(3). It could conceivably happen
that there might be one civil passenger, one piece of civil cargo or one piece of
mail on board a military aircraft, and the carriage of any of these for remuneration or hire would be sufficient to attract the application of the convention to
the whole aircraft and to all persons on board, even if none of the latter was a
civilian. In view of this problem, the Subcommittee considered it to be necessary
that the Legal Committee reexamine the questions of the manner and the extent
to which the convention would apply to military, customs or police aircraft. In
this connection, the Subcommittee was of the opinion that any aircraft, even one
owned or operated by a State, should, if used in the carriage of passenger, cargo
or mail for remuneration or hire, be covered by the convention at least in so far
as civilians on board were concerned.
9.
Another aspect of the problem noted by the Subcommittee was that aircraft not owned by the State, but on charter to the State for military, customs
or police services, might be considered to be State aircraft under two different
hypotheses:
(a)

the whole capacity was chartered by military, customs or police
services;
(b) only part of the capacity of the aircraft was chartered by military,
customs or police services and the balance of the capacity was
chartered to private interests.

9.1
The Subcommittee calls attention to the necessity of finding a solution
for these problems concerning State aircraft.
Article 2
10.
After lengthy debate a majority of the Subcommittee decided to recommend the deletion of Article 2 of the Munich draft. In reaching this conclusion
the Subcommittee considered the following matters.
10.1
The Subcommittee noted that the purpose of Article 2 of the Munich
draft was to define the term "offences" for the purpose of the convention. Here
two questions arose:
(a) The exact meaning and effect of the term "offences."
(b) The jurisdiction to which offencos must be related in order to come
under the convention.
(a) The meaning and effect of the term "offences"
11.
One opinion voiced in the Subcommittee was that the offences should be
listed in classes, such as, offences against the person and offences against property.
Another approach would be to exclude the large number of minor offences that
might otherwise fall within the convention by restricting Article 2 to offences
which were of a serious nature or were extraditable. A further opinion was that
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offences subject to the convention should be only those which jeopardize the safety
of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein, or which jeopardize good order
and discipline on board the aircraft, as in the formula used in Article 5 (1) of
the Munich draft.
In regard to another aspect of this question, one opinion was that it
11.1
should be made clear whether, in the case of Federal States, the penal laws contemplated in that article were those of the Federation or of individual States in
the Federation.
(b) The jurisdiction to which offences must be related in order to come
under the convention
12.
Since Article 2 of the Munich draft provided that the offences subject
to the convention were those punishable by the penal laws of a Contracting State
competent in accordance with Article 3, the Subcommittee considered the question
whether competent jurisdictions under Article 3 of the Munich draft were, on
the one hand, merely those of the State of registration of the aircraft and the
State in whose airspace the offence was committed, or, on the other hand, any
jurisdiction that might be applicable under national law. However, when the
Subcommittee had finished its work on Article 3, it became apparent that, if
Article 3 was adopted in its new form, Article 2 of the Munich draft would
serve no useful purpose. In this regard, it was observed that Article 2 was not
needed in order to define anything in Article 3 because the latter article was
concerned solely with the question of jurisdiction.
Article 3, paragraph 1 (Introductory Words)
13.
The words "Independently of any other applicable jurisdiction" occurring
at the beginning of Article 3 (1) of the Munich draft raised two difficulties:
(1) There was the question whether they meant that there was a general concurrence of jurisdiction of the State of registration of the
aircraft with the penal jurisdiction of other States imposed for any
other reason or under any other legal theory (e.g., nationality of
the offender, nationality of the victim, etc.).
(2) There was a possibility that they could be construed as importing
into the convention any jurisdiction that might be applicable under
national law.
One argument adduced in favour of retaining the words "Independent13.1
ly . . ." was that to delete them might imply nullifying extraterritorial jurisdiction of a State (not being the State of registration of the aircraft) over its
nationals or permanent residents.
However, it was finally decided to recommend the deletion of those
13.2
words. At the same time, the Subcommittee decided to recommend that the following text be included in a separate paragraph in Article 3:
"This article does not set aside any basis for criminal jurisdiction
which a State might have incorporated into its national laws."
Article 3, paragraph 1 (Second Part)
The expression "competent jurisdiction" used in the remaining part of
14.
Article 3 (1) raised two questions:
(1) Was it obligatory or optional for a State to enact laws giving it
jurisdiction?
(2) Was it obligatory or optional for a State to try offenders and to
apply its penal laws to them?
The Subcommittee could not agree on an answer to the first question
15.
and calls the attention of the Legal Committee to the necessity of reaching a
decision on this question.
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16.
In regard to the second question, the Subcommittee considered that, while
it should be recognized that the State of registration was competent to apply
its penal law to offences occurring on board its aircraft outside its territory, that
State would be under no obligation to try offenders and apply its penal laws to
them.
Article 3, paragraph 2
17.
In relation to Article 3 (2), the Subcommittee discussed whether or not
Article 3 contained a system of priorities. According to one view, the intent
of the Munich draft was that there should be absolute concurrence of jurisdiction
since a proposal to have a system of priorities had been defeated during the
Twelfth Session of the Legal Committee at Munich by a vote of 14 to 5. However,
another view was that Article 3 (2) provided, in the cases enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (e), for a priority of the State in whose airspace the offence
was committed. In addition, it was noted that, as drafted at Munich, Article 3 (2)
contained a direct prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction by the State
in whose airspace the offence was committed except in the cases mentioned therein.
18.
On a practical level, the Subcommittee decided that the question of
priority would be governed largely by the extent to which extradition treaties
existed. After exhaustive debate, it decided that it would not recommend any
system of priority to the Legal Committee but that it would recommend revision
of Article 3 (2) in order to make it clear that this provision dealt solely with the
problem of keeping interference with air traffic to a minimum and did not
establish any sort of priority.
19.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee decided to recommend the deletion of
the introductory part in Article 3 (2) of the Munich draft and the adoption, in
its place, of the principle that the State overflown should not oblige the aircraft
to land in order to exercise criminal jurisdiction except in the cases enumerated
in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of that Article. This action was stated to be without
prejudice to the other rights of States under such international instruments as
the Chicago Convention and the International Air Services Transit Agreement.
20.
The Subcommittee, therefore, recommends that the following text be
substituted for the introductory part of Article 3 (2) of the Munich draft:
"The State in whose airspace the offence was committed, if such
State is not the State of registration of the aircraft, may not compel
the aircraft to land in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction,
except in the following cases: . . ."
Article 3, paragraph 3-new paragraph
21.
See paragraph 13.2 above.
Article 4
22.
The Subcommittee rejected a proposal to delete Article 4, such proposal
having been made on the grounds that it was unnecessary and that it was difficult
to formulate its principle with accuracy. Among the reasons suggested in
favour of retaining the article was that it was necessary in view of the system
of concurrent jurisdiction found in the Munich draft convention.
22.1
Although the article was retained, the Subcommittee nevertheless decided to recommend the following amendments to it:
(I) substitute the words "convicted in" in place of "prosecuted by the
authorities of";
(2) add after the words "national of" the words "or permanently resident in";
(3) include in Article 4 the principle that a sentence or any part thereof
already served should, in the case of subsequent conviction for the
same act, be deducted in all eases, including that of a national.
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22.2
A proposal to add to Article 4 the words: "or the offence was against
the national security of such State" was defeated by a tie vote.
22.3
In view of the foregoing decisions, the Subcommittee recommends the
adoption of the following text of Article 4:
"Where a final judgment has been rendered by the authorities of
one Contracting State in respect of a person for an offence, such
person shall not be convicted in another Contracting State for the
same act, if he was acquitted or if, in the case of a conviction, the
sentence was remitted or fully executed, or if the time for the
execution of the sentence has expired, unless he is a national of, or
permanently resident in, such State and its laws permit such further
trial." (Note: As indicated above, Article 4 should be completed by
the inclusion of the principle concerning deduction for a sentence
or any part thereof served abroad.)

Article 5, paragraph 1
23.
In view of the decision to include in the introductory part of Article
1(1) the formula taken from the introductory part of Article 5 (1) of the
Munich draft, the Subcommittee recommends the deletion from Article 5(1) of
the words "which, whether or not it is an offence, may or do jeopardize the safety
of the aircraft, or persons or property thereon, or which jeopardizes good order
and discipline on board," and the substitution therefor of the words "contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1."
23.1
The Subcommittee decided to recommend that the expression "measures
of restraint" be amended to read "measures including restraint", because the
existing expression appeared to specify "restraint" as the only measure which
could be taken. It also decided to recommend that the word "measures" should
be qualified by the term "reasonable."
23.2
The question was raised whether the expression "which seem necessary"
should not be changed so as to provide for a subjective test, namely, "which seem
to him to be necessary." It was decided to place this proposal before the Legal
Committee without the Subcommittee taking a decision upon it.
23.3
It was agreed to recommend that the word "disembark" should be added
in clause (c) before the words "the person" in place of the word "deliver"; and
also to insert the words "or deliver such person" after the words "restrained."
Clause (c), as thus amended, would read as follows:
"(c) to enable him to disembark the person so restrained or deliver
such person to competent authorities."
23.4
In view of the foregoing recommendations, the proposed new text of
Article 5 (1) would read as follows:
"1. When the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the
aircraft, an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, the aircraft commander may impose upon such person reasonable measures
including restraint which seem [to him] to be necessary:
(a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or persons or property therein; or
(b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
(c) to enable him to disembark the person so restrained or
deliver such person to competent authorities."

Article 5, paragraph 3
24.
The Subcommittee agreed to recommend to the Legal Committee that,
in the first sentence of Article 5 (3), the words "when enbarkation on board has
been completed and the moment when disembarkation has commenced" should
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be replaced by the words "when the person concerned has embarked and the
moment when he disembarks." Here, it was noted that acts jeopardizing the
safety of the aircraft and its contents could occur even if only a single passenger
was on board during the period of embarkation or disembarkation. In such a
case, even if the doors of the aircraft were open, measures to preserve safety
might be so urgently required that crew members could hardly be expected to
wait for the intervention of local police.
24.1
In this regard, the Subcommittee invites attention to the comments
made in paragraph 7 above.
25.
The Subcommittee, therefore, recommends the adoption of the following
new text of Article 5 (3):
"(3) Such powers of the aircraft commander, crew members and
passengers and the powers conferred by Article 6 may be exercised
with respect to an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, when
committed between the moment when the person concerned has
embarked and the moment when he disembarks if the flight is one of
those described in Article 1, paragraph 1. In the case of a forced
landing outside an airport, such powers of the aircraft commander
shall continue as to acts committed on board until competent
authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft, persons
and property on board."
Article 6, paragraph 1
26.
In regard to the first part of this provision, it was pointed out that the
aircraft commander might have difficulty in deciding whether or not an act
constituted an "offence," let alone a "serious offence." This would be so even
if he had to make such determination merely by reference to the law of the
flag of the aircraft. The difficulty would be compounded if he had, instead, to
refer to the penal laws of a wide variety of States. In particular, it was observed
that an act which might be a serious offence under the law of one State, might
not even be an offence under the law of another.
26.1
The Subcommittee, therefore, agreed that the convention should establish an objective test, i.e., one which would enable the aircraft commander to
disembark a person who jeopardizes safety or good order and discipline. Accordingly, it recommends that there be deleted from Article 6(1) the words "has
committed a serious offence on board the aircraft, or."
26.2
In order to be consistent with the amendments recommended in the case of
Articles 1 (1) and 5(1), the Subcommittee recommends the deletion from Articles
6 (1) of the words "which, whether or not it is an offence, may or does jeopardize
the safety of the aircraft, or persons or property therein, or which jeopardizes
good order and discipline on board" and the substitution therefor of the words
"contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1".
26.3
Consequently the proposed new text of Article 6(1) reads as follows:
"1. The aircraft commander may disembark in the territory of any
State in which the aircraft lands any person who he-has reasonable
grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board
the aircraft an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1."
26.4
The next question considered by the Subcommittee was whether the aircraft commander should be empowered to disembark a person in "any" State
under the circumstances described in Article 6(1), because this would include
non-contracting States. In this regard, it was appreciated that the convention
would bind only Contracting States and that it could not impose requirements on
a non-contracting State. However, the Subcommittee was of the opinion that it
would nevertheless be appropriate for the convention to continue to grant the
aircraft commander the power of disembarkation under Article 6(1) in any
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State since such a provision, coupled with the provision giving him immunity
from suit (Article 9), would protect him in circumstances where disembarkation was necessary in the interest of safety and good order and discipline, irrespective of whether or not the State of landing was willing to permit the person
disembarked to remain in its territory.

Article 6, paragraph 2
27.
In connection with Article 6(2), the Subcommittee considered several
problems including the following:
(1) Whether the text of the Munich draft was susceptible of the interpretation that the aircraft commander might hold the person
concerned in custody while the aircraft was on the ground in a noncontracting State in order to deliver him to the competent authorities of the next Contracting State in which the aircraft landed.
(2) Whether the aircraft commander might deliver to the competent
authorities of a Contracting State any person on whom he had
imposed restraint by virtue of action taken under Article 5.
(3) Whether Article 6(2) should be confined to the case where the
aircraft commander had reason to believe that the person concerned
had committed on board an aircraft an act which, in his opinion,
was a serious offence under the penal laws of the State of registration.
Having examined all of the three problems mentioned above, the Sub27.1
committee adopted and recommends the following new text of Article 6(2):
"2. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Contracting State in the territory of which the aircraft
lands any person upon whom he has imposed measures of restraint
pursuant to Article 5, if he has reasonable grounds to believe that
such person has committed on board the aircraft an act which, in
his opinion, is a serious offence according to the penal laws of the
State of registration of the aircraft."
27.2
In the case of the first problem, it was recalled that the Legal Committee
at Munich had taken a clear decision not to permit the onward carriage of the
suspected offender under the circumstances described in item (1) above. (ICAO
Legal Committee, Twelfth Session, Vol. I (Minutes), page 187.) That being so,
the Subcommittee decided to recommend that there be no exception which would
permit the onward carriage of the suspected offender to a Contracting State from
a non-contracting State in which a landing had been made. However, the Subcommittee calls the attention of the Legal Committee to the fact that neither the
recommended text, nor the Munich text disposes of the possible interpretation
mentioned.

Article 8, paragraph 1
One criticism made of Article 8(1) was that it served no useful purpose,
28.
since the State of registration of the aircraft could always require, under its
national laws, the kind of reports contemplated by that provision.
It was indicated that if Article 8 (1) had any virtue at all, it was
28.1
that the provision would serve as a defence under Article 9 of the Munich draft
if an action was brought against an aircraft commander for having made a report
of the kind contemplated by Article 8 (1). However, the Subcommittee felt that
this was a situation which persons reporting offences commonly had to face
outside the convention, and that there was no need to have a specific provision
covering this point.
In view of the foregoing, it was agreed to recommend that Article 8 (1)
28.2

be deleted.
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Article 8, paragraph 2
29.
The Subcommittee did not adopt a proposal to delete Article 8(2). Instead, it decided to recommend that, under the circumstances described in Article
8(2), some notification should be given to the competent authorities of the
State where the aircraft intended to land, but that the obligation to notify
should apply only in relation to a case where a person on board was under restraint by virtue of the provision of Article 5. In reaching this decision, the
Subcommittee noted that, quite aside from any obligation that the aircraft
commander might have to give notifications under the convention, he could, in
any event, of his own volition, notify the competent authorities of any State
of any occurrences on board his aircraft.
29.1
The Subcommittee adopted the following text which it recommends as a
substitute for the provisions of Article 8 of the Munich draft:
"The aircraft commander shall, before landing in the territory
of a State, with a person on board who is under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, as soon as practicable, notify
the competent authorities of the State where he intends to land of
the fact that a person on board is under restraint and of the reasons
for such restraint."

Article 9
30.
The Subcommittee decided to recommend the deletion of the word "reasonable" before the words "restraint" and "performance" respectively, and, as
previously mentioned in paragraph 23.1 above, to introduce the word "reasonable"
before the word "measures" in Article 5 (1).
30.1
Doubt was expressed as to whether the words "any proceedings" were
sufficient to cover not only civil and criminal proceedings but also, as intended
by the Legal Committee at Munich, proceedings of an administrative character
such, for example, as any which might lead to revocation of a license of a crew
member. The Subcommittee decided that this was a question of drafting which
could be considered by the Legal Committee.

Article 10, paragraph 1
31.
The Subcommittee decided to call to the attention of the Legal Committee that it appears from the comments of some States that it might be desirable to make it clear that the immigration laws of the State in whose territory
a person was disembarked would not be affected by this convention; 1 also that
any right of the State of disembarkation, under its national law, to require an
airline to carry the unwanted passenger away or to pay for his transportation,
would not be affected by the convention.

Article 10, paragraph 2
32.
The Munich draft does not deal with the question as to what arrangements may be made by the State in whose territory a person is disembarked or
delivered by the aircraft commander but the authorities of which State do not
wish to detain him. Comments received from certain States indicated the desirability of adding in Article 10 a provision to solve this question. Therefore,
the Subcommittee recommends that a provision along the following lines should
be included as paragraph 4 in Article 10:
"At the request of the State in whose territory the person is
disembarked or delivered, the State of which he is a national, the
State of which he is a permanent resident and the State in which he
began his journey shall be obliged to admit him into its territory,
unless he is a national of, or permanent resident in, the requesting
State."
See the Minutes of the Twelfth Session of the Legal Committee, Vol. I, pp. 194-197.
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32.1
While accepting the foregoing, some members wished to expand the
principle along the following lines:
(a)

that in addition to the States mentioned, the State of destination
of the passenger disembarked or delivered should also be obliged
to accept him; and
(b) that as amongst the foregoing States, there should be an order of
priority established in regard to the obligation to admit such person.
32.2
Another question raised in the comments of some States with reference
to paragraph 2 of Article 10 was to the effect that, if the State where a person
is delivered by the aircraft commander does not have jurisdiction or does not
wish to exercise it, it should nevertheless be obliged, by a specific provision in
the convention, to arrest such person provisionally, pending the receipt of a
request for extradition in accordance with existing treaties. This would be the
case only if the elements of an extraditable offence were disclosed. A specific
proposal in this connection was that the convention should provide that the
delivery of the person concerned by the aircraft commander should be deemed
to constitute a request for provisional arrest in order to set in motion the procedures relevant to extradition. In this way the State would be enabled to detain
the person concerned provisionally for a short time. These proposals failed to
find a majority in the Subcommittee.
32.3
The Subcommittee decided to recommend that the word "apparent" in
the English text before the word "offence" in paragraph 2 should be deleted and
replaced by the word "alleged."
32.4
It appeared to the Subcommittee that the present drafting of paragraph 2 of Article 10 was unclear in that it probably did not fully bring out the
intention of the Munich draft that the State in whose territory a person is
delivered by the aircraft commander is under no obligation to take him into
custody; that it would take him into custody only if its laws so permitted and
further only if the circumstances of the particular case warranted that action;
and, lastly, that all its national procedures and laws relevant to safeguarding
of human rights, such as the maximum period of detention, the right to have
councel, the right to be informed of the specific reasons for his arrest and so on,
would be applicable to the case.

Article 10, paragraph 3
33.
In the opinion of the Subcommittee, the present language of the opening
portion of paragraph 3 is inaccurate in speaking of "the State having custody."
Actually, it might be that the State has refused to take the individual concerned
into custody. Therefore, the Subcommittee recommends that the expression "if
the State having custody" be replaced by the phrase "if the State to which the
person is delivered by the aircraft commander."
33.1
The Subcommittee decided to recommend that the word "apparent"
occurring before the word "offence" in the English text of Article 10(3) should
be deleted and replaced by the word "alleged".
33.2
Accordingly, the Subcommittee recommends the adoption of the following text of Article 10(3):
"If the State to which the person is delivered by the aircraft commander pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 2, has no jurisdiction over
the offence or does not wish to exercise such jurisdiction, it shall
make a preliminary investigation of the alleged offence and shall
report its findings and such statement or other evidence as it may
obtain to any State in whose territorial airspace the offence was
committed, the State of registration of the aircraft and the State
of nationality of the suspected offender."
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Proposed Additional Provisions
Extradition
34.
The Subcommittee examined a proposal to introduce the following new
article into the convention:
"Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to create a right to
request extradition of any person or an obligation to grant extradition. However, the term "jurisdiction" in any arrangements respecting extradition between States parties to this Convention shall, with
respect to an offence to which this Convention applies, be taken to
include jurisdiction as specified in Article 3 (1) of this Convention."
34.1
The second sentence of the proposal was regarded by some as objectionable, because it would be dangerous to try to modify, by a multilateral treaty,
existing bilateral treaties concerning extradition. The exact terms and language
of each one of the latter treaties, of which there might be several hundred, would
have to be examined and interpreted, before the proposed second sentence of the
new article could be accepted and this was impracticable. However it was agreed
that it was necessary to consider the problem dealt with by the second sentence.
34.2
In view of the foregoing, the Subcommittee
(1) recommends that the draft convention include an article reading
as follows:
"Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to create a right
to request extradition of any person or an obligation to grant extradition."; and
(2) calls the attention of the Legal Committee to the problem raised by
the second sentence.

"Hijacking"

(Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft)

35.
A United States proposal (LC/SC "Legal Status 1962" No. 5) was placed
before the Subcommittee. In this connection the Subcommittee discussed the
problem of the carriage of arms on aircraft.
35.1
There was general agreement that the United States proposal was important. It was noted that this proposal would introduce a description of a
particular crime into the draft convention which up till now did not refer
specifically to any particular offence.
35.2
The Members of the Subcommittee pointed out that they had not had
an opportunity of consulting the authorities in their respective States in regard
to the United States proposal because they had received the proposal at a late
date. Thus, there had been very little time to consider the important issues
arising from the proposal. The Subcommittee considered that the proposal should
be examined by the Governments of the Contracting States, so that the Legal
Committee, when it met in Rome, on 28 August 1962, would have the views of
the Governments before it. It was also the general opinion that, while the proposal
could be the subject matter of a separate international agreement, nevertheless
it raised questions closely related to the Munich draft convention. Accordingly,
the Subcommittee decided to recommend to the Legal Committee to consider the
United States proposal in connection with the Munich draft convention.

Chartered Aircraft
36.
The Subcommittee considered a suggestion that the convention should
include the following provision concerning chartered aircraft:
"An aircraft chartered without a crew to an operator who is a
national of a State other than the State of registration of the air-
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craft shall, for the purpose of this Convention, be treated as if,
for the period of charter, it was registered in the State of which
the charterer is a national."
36.1
The Subcommittee was given the example of an offence being committed
on board an aircraft leased by the operator of the State of registration to an
operator located in a State far removed from the State of registration. Such
offence might be committed over the high seas on the other side of the world by
a person who did not have the remotest connection with the State of registration
of the aircraft. Under these circumstances it would be impracticable to insist
that the offender should be taken to the State of registration for trial.
36.2
Some uneasiness was expressed in regard to the proposed text, since
the nationality of the operator was not necessarily a good basis for constructive
registration of a chartered aircraft. For example, the operator might be a person
or entity of dual nationality or even a Stateless person.
36.3
The Subcommittee decided to report to the Legal Committee that the
problems dealt with by the above-mentioned proposal is an important matter
which requires solution, but that the foregoing proposal had some defects. In any
event, the Subcommittee noted that the Council had referred Resolution B of the
Guadalajara Conference to the Fourteenth Session of the Assembly, and that this
Resolution dealt with a very closely related problem. Consequently, the Subcommittee was of the opinion that whatever work was carried out by the Legal
Committee on the question of chartered aircraft in relation to the draft convention on offences and other acts occurring on board aircraft should be consistent with the work which ICAO might carry out with respect to Resolution B
of the Guadalajara Conference.
37.
In the course of making this report on the comments received from
States and international organizations on the Munich draft convention, the
Subcommittee has made recommendations for redrafting some of the articles of
the Munich draft. For convenience, the recommended redraft of each article of
the draft convention is set out in the Appendix hereto, which contains also,

for comparison, the Munich text of all the articles.
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APPENDIX

Text of the Munich draft convention
Article 1
1. This Convention shall apply in
respect of the offences and other acts
hereinafter mentioned when committed or done by a person on board
any civil aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is:

Text of redraft proposed
by the Subcommittee
(Montreal, March-April 1962)
Article 1
1. This Convention shall apply in
respect of offences and of acts which,
whether or not they are an offence,
may or do jeopardize the safety of the
aircraft or persons or property therein
or which jeopardize good order and
discipline on board when committed
or done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting State,
while that aircraft is: (see para. 4 of
the Report)

(a)

in flight in the airspace of a State
other than the State of registration; or

(a) No change

(b)

in flight between two points of
which at least one is outside the
State of registration; or

(b) No change

(c) in flight in the airspace of the
State of registration if a subsequent landing is made in another
Contracting State with the said
person still on board; or

(c) in flight between two points in
the territory of the State of registration if a subsequent landing is
made in another Contracting
State with the said person still on
board; or (see para. 6 of the Report)

(d) on the surface of the high seas or

(d) No change

of any other area outside the
territory of any State.
2. For the purposes of this Convention an aircraft is considered to be in
flight from the moment when power
is applied for the purpose of actual
take-off until the moment when the
landing run ends.

2. No change

3. This Convention shall not apply
to State aircraft. Aircraft used in
military, customs and police services
shall be deemed to be State aircraft;
however, any aircraft engaged in the
carriage of passengers, cargo or mail
for remuneration or hire shall be subject to this Convention.

3. No change (But see paras. 8 and
9.1 of the Report)
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Article 2
Offences, for the purposes of this
Convention, are offences punishable
by the penal laws of a Contracting
State competent in accordance with
Article 3.

Article 2
Deleted (see paras. 10-12 of the
Report)

Article 3

Article 3

1. Independently of any other applicable jurisdiction, the State of registration of the aircraft is competent to
exercise jurisdiction over offences
committed on board the aircraft.

1. The State of registration of the
aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed on
board the aircraft. (see para 13.2 of
the Report)

2. The criminal jurisdiction of a
State in whose airspace the offence
was committed, if such State is not
the State of registration of the aircraft or the State where the aircraft
lands, shall not be exercised in connection with any offence committed on
an aircraft in flight, except in the
following cases:

2. The State in whose airspace the
offence was committed, if such State
is not the State of registration of the
aircraft, may not compel the aircraft
to land in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction, except in the following cases: (see para. 20 of the Report)

(a)

if the offence has effect on the
territory of such State;

(a) No change

(b)

if the offence has been committed
by or against a national of such
State;

(b) No change

(c)

if the offence is against the national security of such State;

(c) No change

(d) if the offence consists of a breach
of any rules and regulations relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft in force in
such State;

(d) No change

(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction is
necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such
State under an international
agreement.

(e) No change

3. This article does not set aside any
basis for criminal jurisdiction which
a State might have incorporated into
its national laws. (see para. 13.2 of
the Report)
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Article 4

Article 4

Where a final judgment has been
rendered by the authorities of one
Contracting State in respect of a person for an offence, such person shall
not be prosecuted by the authorities
of another Contracting State for the
same act, if he was acquitted or if, in
the case of a conviction, the sentence
was remitted or fully executed, or if
the time for the execution of the
sentence has expired, unless he is a
national of such State and its laws
permit such further trial.

Where a final judgment has been
rendered by the authorities of one
Contracting State in respect of a person for an offence, such person shall
not be convicted in another Contracting State for the same act, if he was
acquitted or if, in the case of a conviction, the sentence was remitted or
fully executed, or if the time for the
execution of the sentence has expired,
unless he is a national of, or permanently resident in, such State and its
laws permit such further trial.
(Note: As indicated in paragraph 22.1
of the report, Article 4 should be
completed by the inclusion of the
principle concerning deduction for a
sentence or any part thereof served
abroad.) (see para. 22.3 of the Report)

Article 5

Article 5

1. When the aircraft commander has
reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has committed, or is about to
commit, on board the aircraft, an act
which, whether or not it is an offence,
may or does jeopardize the safety of
the aircraft, or persons or property
therein, or which jeopardizes good
order and discipline on board, the aircraft commander may impose upon
such person measures of restraint
which seem necessary:

1. When the aircraft commander has
reasonable grounds to believe that a
person has committed, or is about to
commit, on board the aircraft, an act
contemplated in Article 1, paragraph
1, the aircraft commander may impose upon such person reasonable
measures including restraint which
seem [to him] to be necessary: (see
para. 23.4 of the Report)

(a)

to protect the safety of the aircraft; or persons or property
therein; or

(a)

No change

(b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or

(b)

No change

(c)

(c)

to enable him to disembark the
person so restrained or deliver
such person to competent authorities. (see para. 23.4 of the
Report)

to enable him to deliver the person so restrained to competent
authorities.
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2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of
other crew members and may request
or authorize, but not require, the assistance of passengers to restrain any
person whom he is entitled to restrain.
Any crew member or passenger may
also take reasonable preventive measures without such authorization when
he has reasonable grounds to believe
that such action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or persons or property therein.

2.

3. Such powers of the aircraft commander, crew members and passengers
and the powers conferred by Article
6 may be exercised with respect to
acts, whether offences or not, of the
kind described in paragraph 1 of this
Article when committed between the
moment when embarkation on board
has been completed and the moment
when disembarkation has commenced
if the flight is one of those described
in Article 1, paragraph 1. In the case
of a forced landing outside an airport,
such powers of the aircraft commander shall continue as to acts committed
on board until competent authorities
take over the responsibility for the
aircraft, persons and property on
board.

3. Such powers of the aircraft commander, crew members and passengers
and the powers conferred by Article 6
may be exercised with respect to an
act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, when committed between
the moment when the person concerned has embarked and the moment
when he disembarks if the flight is
one of those described in Article 1,
paragraph 1. In the case of a forced
landing outside an airport, such powers of the aircraft commander shall
continue as to acts committed on
board until competent authorities take
over the responsibility for the aircraft, persons and property on board.
(see para. 25 of the Report)

4. For the purposes of this Convention, the aircraft commander is the
individual on board an aircraft who
is responsible for the operation and
safety of that aircraft.

4.

No change

No change

Arlicle 6

Article 6

1. The aircraft commander may disembark in the territory of any State
in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to
believe has committed a serious offence
on board the aircraft, or has committed, or is about to commit, on
board the aircraft an act which,
whether or not it is an offence, may
or does jeopardize the safety of the
aircraft, or persons or property therein, or which jeopardizes good order
and discipline on board.

1. The aircraft commander may disembark in the territory of any State
in which the aircraft lands any person
who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to
commit, on board the aircraft an act
contemplated in Article 1, paragraph
1. (see para. 26.3 of the Report)
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2. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of
any Contracting State in the territory
of which the aircraft lands any person
who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed a serious offence
on board the aircraft.

2. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of
any Contracting State in the territory
of which the aircraft lands any person
upon whom he has imposed measures
of restraint pursuant to Article 5, if
he has reasonable grounds to believe
that such person has committed on
board the aircraft an act which, in his
opinion, is a serious offence according
to the penal laws of the State of registration of the aircraft. (see para. 27.1
of the Report)

Article 7

Article 7

The aircraft commander shall transmit to the authorities to whom any
suspected offender is delivered pursuant to the provisions of Article 6,
paragraph 2, relevant evidence and
information which, in accordance with
the law of the State of registration of
the aircraft, are lawfully in his possession.

No change

Article 8

Article 8

1. The aircraft commander shall report to the competent authorities of
the State of registration of the aircraft the fact that an apparent offence has occurred on board, any
restraint of any person, and any other
action taken pursuant to this Convention, in such manner as the State
of registration may require.

1. Deleted (see para. 28.2 of the Report)

2. The aircraft commander shall, as
soon as practicable, notify the competent authorities of any Contracting
State in which the aircraft lands of
the fact that an apparent offence or an
act endangering the safety of the aircraft or persons or property therein
has occurred and that the suspected
person is on board.

The aircraft commander shall, before landing in the territory of a State
with a person on board who is under
restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, as soon as practicable, notify the competent authorities of the State where he intends to
land of the fact that a person on
board is under restraint and of the
reasons for such restraint. (see para.
29.1 of the Report)
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Article 9

Article 9

Neither the aircraft commander,
other member of the crew, a passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft nor the person on whose behalf
the flight was performed, shall be liable in any proceedings brought in
respect either of any reasonable restraint imposed under the circumstances stated in Article 5 or of the
reasonable performance of other action authorized by Articles 6, 7 and 8.

Neither the aircraft commander,
other member of the crew, a passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft nor the person on whose behalf
the flight was performed, shall be liable in any proceedings brought in
respect either of any restraint imposed under the circumstances stated
in Article 5 or of the performance of
other action authorized by Articles 6,
7 and 8. (see para. 30 of the Report)

Article 10

Article 10

1. Any Contracting State shall allow
the commander of an aircraft registered in another Contracting State to
disembark any person pursuant to
Article 6, paragraph 1.

1. No change

2. Any Contracting State shall take
custody of any person whom the aircraft commander delivers pursuant to
Article 6, paragraph 2, upon being
satisfied that the circumstances warrant taking such person into custody
and the Contracting State assumes
such obligation pursuant to its regulations and laws. If the circumstances
involve an offence the State having
custody shall promptly notify any
State in whose territorial airspace the
offence was committed, the State of
registration of the aircraft and the
State of nationality of the suspected
offender of the nature of the apparent
offence and the fact that the suspected offender is in custody.

2. No change except that in the
English text the word "apparent" before "offence" is to be changed to
"alleged". (see para. 32.3 of the Report)

3. If the State having custody has
no jurisdiction over the offence or
does not wish to exercise such jurisdiction, it shall make a preliminary
investigation of the apparent offence
and shall report its findings and such
statements or other evidence as it may
obtain to any State in whose territorial airspace the offence was committed, the State of registration of
the aircraft and the State of nationality of the suspected offender.

3. If the State to which the person
is delivered by the aircraft commander pursuant to Article 6, paragraph
2, has no jurisdiction over the offence
or does not wish to exercise such jurisdiction, it shall make a preliminary
investigation of the alleged offence
and shall report its findings and such
statements or other evidence as it may
obtain to any State in whose territorial airspace the offence was committed, the State of registration of
the aircraft and the State of nationality of the suspected offender. (see
para. 33.2 of the Report)
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4. At the request of the State in
whose territory the person is disembarked or delivered, the State of
which he is a national, the State of
which he is a permanent resident and
the State in which he began his journey shall be obligated to admit him
into its territory, unless he is a national of, or permanent resident in,
the requesting State. (see para. 32 of
the Report)

Article 11
In taking any measures for investigation or arrest or otherwise exercising jurisdiction in connection with
any offence committed on board an
aircraft the Contracting States shall
pay due regard to the safety and other
interests of air navigation and shall so
act as to avoid unnecessary delay of
the aircraft, passengers, crew or cargo.

Article 11
No change

Extradition

Extradition

No provision concerning extradition
appears in the Munich draft.

Nothing in this Convention shall
be deemed to create a right to request
extradition of any person or an obligation to grant extradition. (see para.
34.2 of the Report)
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REPORT OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE RAPPORTEUR ON
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS CONCERNING
LIABILITY IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
1.
At its Munich meeting, the Legal Committee appointed a rapporteur to
report on international conventions concerning liability in respect of nuclear materials, in the course of preparation by the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.).
The O.E.E.C. (now replaced by O.E.C.D.) is an organization consisting of seventeen European States, but the United States and Canada have a certain interest as
associated States. The I.A.E.A. is associated with the United Nations.
2.
On July 29th, 1960, the O.E.E.C. Convention was signed at Paris. It has
been ratified by Spain and Turkey. Though primarily of regional interest because
of its geographical application, it is also of wider interest because it deals with
problems which may arise in any part of the world. Your rapporteur may therefore be forgiven for examining it in some detail, insofar as it affects civil aviation.
To do so may assist in examining the drafts prepared under the auspices of the
I.A.E.A. [See 27 J. Air L. & Com. 170-80 (1960) ed.]
3.
The Paris Convention is based on the premise that damage caused by a
nuclear incident may be of catastrophic proportions. It is accepted, from inquiries made, that there is a limit to the amount of insurance cover which is
available for that kind of damage, and that nuclear insurance will not in practice
be available to the general public, as the available cover will be exhausted by insurance taken out by the operators of nuclear installations. Accordingly, the Paris
Convention adopts two general principles:
(i) All liability for nuclear damage is channelled to the operator of
the nuclear installation, that is to say, the operator of the installation is made liable without proof of fault, and every other person is
exonerated from liability, even though at fault. (Articles 3 and 6).
(ii) A limit is placed upon the liability of the operator of the nuclear
installation, who is required to carry insurance or make other provision for meeting his liability up to that limit. (Article 7).
4.
The first of these principles is possibly novel in jurisprudence. In relieving
negligent persons of liability, it recognizes that the prospect of incurring civil
liability is not always an essential incentive to taking care; the consequences of
negligence may be so serious as to amount to an incentive in themselves, and penal
provisions may further discourage negligent conduct. The principle also recognizes
that it is likely to be fruitless to impose civil liability on the negligent person if
he is in practice unable to provide financial cover to meet so large a potential
obligation. In consequence, the Convention applies the theory of risque to the
operator of the nuclear installation, without whose activities there would be no
danger of a nuclear incident. It not only saddles him with liability, whether or
not he is at fault, but requires him to carry insurance or make other financial
provision (e.g. obtain a government guarantee) so as to ensure that he can meet
his obligations. Because it is impossible to obtain insurance up to an unlimited
amount, the liability of the operator of the nuclear installation, and with it the
duty to carry insurance, are limited to 15,000,000 European Monetary Agreement
units of account (corresponding to the United States dollar), or such greater or
lesser amount as may be established by the law of the Contracting State in which
the nuclear installation is situated, having regard to the operator's possibilities of
obtaining insurance or other security; but the lowest limit which may be established is the equivalent of U.S. $5,000,000.
5.
Your rapporteur does not propose to restate the many detailed provisions
of the Convention, but only to examine those points which appear to be of special
interest from the viewpoint of civil aviation. These concern-
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(a) the carriage of nuclear substances by air; and
(b) the collision of aircraft with nuclear installations, or with ships,
vehicles or aircraft carrying nuclear substances.
The Convention does not deal with the possible development of nuclear-propelled
aircraft.
The Convention applies to damage to or loss of life of any person, as well
6.
as damage or loss of any property, caused by a nuclear incident involving nuclear
fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or nuclear substances coming from, a
nuclear installation. (Articles 3 and 4). An effect of these provisions, when interpreted with the aid of a somewhat complicated system of definitions (Article
1) is to exclude from the provisions of the Convention radioisotopes outside a
nuclear installation which are used or intended to be used for any industrial, commercial, agricultural, medical or scientific purpose. Your rapporteur understands
that isotopes of this nature are the principal nuclear substances likely to be carried
by air, and that an accident to them is not likely to produce the catastrophic consequences at which the Convention is directed. Radioactive waste, which may
involve catastrophic consequences, is in practice excluded from carriage by air
because of the great weight of the required shielding, and because of the lack of
an economic need for its speedy arrival at its destination. Accordingly, the interest
of the Convention for aircraft operators as carriers of nuclear substances is somewhat limited, though it is not excluded.
Your rapporteur understands that it is by no means impossible for the col7.
lision of an aircraft with a nuclear installation, or with a ship or vehicle carrying
nuclear substances, to give rise to damage on a large scale, particularly in case of
a fire which disseminates radioactive particles. It is for this reason that the laws
of some States regulate the height below which an aircraft may not fly above or
near a nuclear installation.
The effect of Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention will be to exonerate the
8.
operator of the Aircraft from all liability for damage caused by a nuclear incident,
and to channel liability solely to the operator of the nuclear installation involved,
which, in the case of carriage of nuclear substances by air, will be either the
nuclear installation from which they come, or the nuclear installation to which
they are consigned. An exception is, however, allowed by Article 4(e) which
permits the legislation of Contracting States to substitute the carrier for the nuclear operator as the person solely liable. This, however, may only be done with
the carrier's consent. The exception was inserted to meet what was thought to
be the not unlikely possibility of the emergence of road carriers who would
specialize in the carriage and insurance of nuclear substances. It might conceivably
result in carriers by air being subject to pressure to make similar arrangements,
but this does not seem to be likely in practice.
Article 4 of the Convention includes provisions for determining its appli9.
cation when the carriage is between a nuclear installation in the territory of a
Contracting State and a point outside that territory, and in such a case liability
is channelled to the operator of the installation in the Contracting State. Under
Article 4 the point at which transition to or from the regime of the Convention
takes place is the point of loading or unloading in the territory of the nonContracting State upon the means of transport by which the nuclear substances have been, or are to be, carried to or from that territory. The Convention
presumably cannot affect the law of the non-Contracting State, unless as part of
the proper law of the contract of carriage. Furthermore, under Article 2 the Convention does not apply to nuclear incidents occurring in the territory of a nonContracting State or to damage suffered there, unless otherwise provided by national legislation (presumably of the Contracting State whose courts are seized
of the case: see Article 14(b)). Article 2 therefore neutralizes to a great degree
the application of the Convention to nuclear substances awaiting unloading, or
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which have been loaded, in the territory of a non-Contracting State. These provisions seem difficult to follow.
10.
The effect of channelling liability to the operator of the nuclear installation, and so relieving the carrier of all liability, may be welcome to aircraft
operators, but it will be contrary to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
where that Convention applies, if indeed nuclear substances are ever carried in
the same aircraft as passengers and other cargo. Similarly, the exoneration of
the aircraft operator may be contrary to the Rome Convention if surface damage
is caused either by a nuclear cargo or by collision with a nuclear installation or
with an aircraft, ship or vehicle carrying nuclear substances. Accordingly, Article
6(b) of the Paris Convention provides that the exoneration conferred by that
Convention is not to affect the application of any international agreement in the
field of transport in force or open for signature, ratification or accession at the
date of the signature of the Paris Convention. The neat device is adopted of
giving the person liable under those Conventions a right of recourse against the
operator of the nuclear installation (Article 6(c)), thereby preventing conflict
with existing Conventions, while at the same time in effect channelling the
liability back to the nuclear operator. His liability will, however, be subject to
limitation, and the aircraft operator will not necessarily recover in full the amount
he has been obliged to pay under existing Conventions. The Guadalajara Convention, signed in September, 1961, is not an existing convention for this purpose, though it may be possible to argue that any liability arising under that
Convention is in truth liability arising under the Warsaw Convention in its
amended form, or as amended at the Hague. There might be some difficulty in
deciding whether, in the peculiar circumstances in which the Guadalajara Convention applies, the air carrier enjoys the right of recourse given by Article 6 (c)
of the Paris text against the operator of the nuclear installation.
11.
It is of importance to aircraft operators that the Paris Convention grants
them exoneration from liability for nuclear damage even though they or their
servants or agents have been guilty of negligence, the operator of the nuclear
installation being given no right of recourse against other persons except in the
limited circumstances of Article 6(f). These are as follows:
(i) if the damage caused by a nuclear incident results from an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage against the individual
acting or omitting to act with such intent;
(ii) if and to the extent that it is so provided expressly by contract;
(iii) if and to the extent that he is liable pursuant to Article 7(e) for
an amount over and above that established with respect to him
pursuant to Article 7(b), in respect of a nuclear incident occurring in the course of transit of nuclear substances carried out
without his consent, against the carrier of the nuclear substances,
except where such transit is for the purpose of saving or attempting to save life or property or is caused by circumstances beyond
the control of such carrier."
Sub-paragraph (iii) relates to an increase of the limits of liability by virtue of
Article 7(e), which allows a State to subject the transit of nuclear substances
through its territory to an increased limit of its own choosing. In such a case the
operator of the nuclear installation may recover from the carrier the amount of
any additional liability which the nuclear operator has incurred by reason of the
nuclear substances being carried, without his consent, into the territory of a
State imposing higher liability. However, Article 7 (e) does not apply to carriage
by air where, by agreement or under international law, there is a right to fly
over or land in the territory of the State concerned. This virtually eliminates
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the risk of an aircraft operator being saddled with any part of the liability for a
nuclear incident under Article 7(e), though an error in navigation might in
certain circumstances produce that result.
12.
Attention is particularly drawn to Article 3 (b) (ii) and Article 7, which
respectively exclude from the strict liability of the nuclear operator damage occurring to the carrying means of transport, and permit that liability to be restored by national legislation so long as the nuclear operator's liability in respect
of other damage is not reduced below $5,000,000. This extraordinary provision
evidently arises from a fear that damage to a particularly expensive means of
transport (whether an aircraft or a ship) might absorb the whole or greater part
of the limitation sum, to the detriment of other claimants.
13.
Also worthy of note is the benefit which the drafters of the Paris Convention may have inadvertently conferred upon aircraft operators by defining
nuclear incident in such a way as to include any occurrence, or succession of occurrences having the same origin, which causes damage, any of which arises out
of radioactive properties. If, therefore, the collision of an aircraft with a nuclear
installation causes any radioactivity damage, however small, the operator of the
nuclear installation will apparently be liable under Article 3 (up to the applicable
limits) not only for the radioactivity damage but also for the impact damage
caused by the collision to the aircraft, its passengers and cargo; and the operator
of the aircraft will be exonerated by Article 6(b) notwithstanding his own
negligence or that of his servants or agents. Whenever, however, the Warsaw
Convention or the Rome Convention applied in the circumstances, the operator
of the aircraft would be primarily liable, but would enjoy a right of recourse
against the operator of the nuclear installation. So far as your rapporteur is aware,
these benefits were not sought by aircraft operators, and indeed he understands
that, with the exception of Sweden, the Governments of the States signatory to
the Convention have subsequently declared that it is not their intention to interpret Article 3 in this generous manner. The effect of those declarations may
depend upon national law.
14.
Article 4(d) of the Convention requires the operator of the nuclear installation to provide the carrier of nuclear substances with a certificate (known
as a "green card") stating the name and address of the nuclear operator, and
the amount, type and duration of the insurance or other financial security covering the shipment. The certificate must be issued by the insurer or other financial
guarantor, and these statements cannot be disputed by him. The certificate is
likely to be of value to carriers, as assuring them that the shipment is in fact
covered by the required security.
15.
Certain reservations made to the Paris Convention are of interest in relation to civil aviation:
(1) The German Federal Republic, Austria and Greece reserved the
right to impose liability on persons additional to the operator of
the nuclear installation but only if those persons are fully covered
by security obtained by the nuclear operator. This reservation,
therefore, allows the aircraft operator to be made liable, but the
nuclear operator must provide him with insurance or similar cover.
Nevertheless, the aircraft operator might suffer detriment if his
aircraft were seized in order to enforce his primary liability. This
reservation evidently flows from a constitutional or philosophical
objection to channelling liability to the operator of the nuclear installation if, for example, the damage has been caused by the negligence of some other person.
(2) Austria, Greece, Norway and Sweden reserved the right to treat as
existing international agreements their existing national legislation
which includes provisions equivalent to those of international agree-
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ments. This would avoid conflict between the Paris Convention and,
for example, national legislation applying the principles of the
Warsaw or Rome Conventions, even though those Conventions did
not in fact apply.
16.
It will be evident from this analysis of those parts of the Paris Convention
which most closely concern civil aviation that it is a complicated and rather
difficult document which applies new principles to a new situation; but that it
can only be welcomed by aircraft operators as relieving them of all, or virtually
all, liability for damage caused by nuclear incidents. At the same time, the passenger and shipper of cargo, and the person suffering surface damage, will be
entitled to recover compensation from the aircraft operator when an existing
convention applies (or, under Reservation (2), is to be treated as applying) and
in other cases to recover directly from the nuclear operator so long as the limit
placed upon his liability is not exceeded. The risk of that limit being exceeded is
counterbalanced by the requirement that insurance cover or other security be
obtained by the nuclear operator, thereby ensuring that the compensation is
actually paid. A Convention supplementary to the Paris Convention is now under
consideration at Brussels under the sponsorship of the Six with a view to increasing
the limits of liability and providing for governmental and inter-governmental
guarantees.
17.
A draft International Convention on Minimum International Standards
Regarding Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage has also been prepared by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, which is associated with the United Nations,
and has its seat at Vienna. At the time of writing it is expected that a diplomatic
conference will meet early in 1963 in order to adopt this draft.
18.
The Vienna draft follows the main principles of the Paris text, with some
welcome simplifications of drafting and arrangement. However, some of the
simplification is achieved by the sacrifice of principles vital to civil aviation. In
particular, in channelling liability to the operator of the nuclear installation, the
Vienna draft makes no saving for existing Conventions, with the consequence that
both the Warsaw and Rome Conventions will be partially overruled. States which
are parties to those Conventions may have difficulty in accepting conflicting
obligations, and may take the view that it is undesirable for existing air law
Conventions to be amended piecemeal by other Conventions, according to the
nature of the damage done. Certain States, it is understood, wish to insert a saving
for existing Conventions similar to that in the Paris text, while one State proposes
to insert an express provision that existing Conventions are pro tanto superseded.
19.
The danger is rendered more acute by the proposal of certain States to
confer upon the nuclear operator the right of recourse against a negligent carrier,
thereby breaching the principle of channelling liability solely to the nuclear
operator. If such a proposal were carried, the limitation of the carrier's libility
under the Warsaw Convention would (in the absence of a saving for existing
Conventions) be swept away, as would the limitation of liability under the Rome
Convention.
20.
It is also proposed to write into the Vienna draft the substance of the
reservation made by certain States to Article 6 (a) of the Paris Convention,
thereby enabling Contracting States to impose liability for nuclear damage upon
a person other than the operator of the nuclear installation, on condition that
that other person is fully covered in respect of his liability by security obtained
by the operator of the nuclear installation. This would render general an exception
allowed as a concession to the constitutional or other scruples of three States,
and would increase the danger that aircraft operators will be involved in litigation concerning nuclear damage and that their aircraft will be attached.
21.
The Vienna draft, unlike the Paris text, does not propose to exclude
damage to the carrying aircraft from the purview of the Convention. This

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
would be an advantage to the carrier, and it is significant that an amendment
has been proposed by two States to bring the Vienna draft into line with the
Paris text on this point. The Vienna draft also does not include the equivalent
of Article 7(e) (ii) of the Paris text, which prohibits a State of transit from
imposing a higher limit of liability when there is a right to overfly or land in
that State by virtue of agreement or international law. This requirement of
additional cover would primarily inconvenience nuclear operators rather than
carriers, but carriers might find themselves liable to their shippers for an unauthorized diversion into the territory of a State imposing a higher limit (see
Article 6(f) (iii) of the Paris text).
22.
The conclusion to be drawn from paragraph 18-21 of this report is that
there is danger that the Vienna text may create difficulties for civil aviation by
interfering with the operation of the Warsaw and Rome Conventions, and that
carriers by air may be subjected to new and unnecessary hazards. Your rapporteur
therefore recommends that I.C.A.O. should examine these possibilities, and take
steps to ensure that this danger is properly met.
23.
The problem of conflict between the Paris and Vienna texts remains to
be solved, as States may find it impossible to be bound by obligations which in
some circumstances are contradictory. The problem will not arise unless and
until the Paris Convention has received sufficient ratifications to come into force.
It might be resolved if the Vienna draft were to be brought into line with the
Paris text (largely by removal of features objectionable from the viewpoint of
civil aviation). Alternatively, the parties to the Paris Convention might make
appropriate reservations to the Vienna text, which your rapporteur understands
is the course now under consideration.

